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Abstract: This article continues a conversation with Hans Boersma on the 
role of Jesus Christ in the beatific vision enjoyed by the saints. In his 
book Seeing God, Boersma maintained that there is a Christological deficit 
in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the beatific vision. In response I 
suggested that Aquinas held that Christ’s beatific vision is forever the 
cause of that of the saints. In his reply to me, Boersma more or less 
accepted my conclusion, but claimed there was still a Christological 
deficit because Aquinas mentions the thesis only rarely. He then drew 
attention to a second, more important factor in the alleged deficit, 
namely, Aquinas’s identification of the divine essence rather than Christ 
as the vision’s object. The present article responds to both elements of the 
alleged deficit, arguing against Boersma on the basis of the Summa 
Theologiae’s structure that there is no such deficit in Aquinas. While 
Boersma, after finding against Aquinas, moves in conclusion “towards a 
theophanic view of the beatific vision,” in my own conclusion I sketch 
out an alternative, Thomist account of the relationship between the 
beatific vision and heavenly theophany. 
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This article continues a conversation with Hans Boersma on the role of Jesus 
Christ in the beatific vision enjoyed by the saints. In his book Seeing God: The 
Beatific Vision in Christian Tradition and elsewhere, Boersma (2018a; 2017) has 
maintained that there is a Christological deficit in Thomas Aquinas’s account of 
the beatific vision, because Aquinas recognised no real role for Christ in this 
vision. In a response to him I suggested that Aquinas held a Christological 
eschatology in which Christ the Head’s beatific vision is forever the cause of 
that of the heavenly members of his Body (Gaine 2018). In his reply to my 
article, Boersma (2018b, 134–35) more or less accepted my conclusion and even 
added in its favour further textual evidence from Aquinas’s corpus, while 
remaining sceptical of some that I had presented. This change in his position, 
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however, Boersma represents as only slight within the context of his overall 
assessment of Aquinas on the beatific vision (Boersma 2018b, 135). He now 
asserts that there remains a Christological deficit in respect of Christ’s causal 
role in the vision, on account of the fact that Aquinas only “rarely alludes” to it. 
That, however, is only one of two “factors that make up Aquinas’s 
christological deficit” (Boersma 2018b, 130).  More important than the first, he 
says, is that, for Aquinas, the object of the beatific vision is not Christ but the 
divine essence. Boersma correctly points out that I did not address this second 
charge in my article, but since he has now drawn attention to that omission, I 
shall take the opportunity here to address both elements of the Christological 
deficit he alleges. Having addressed each in turn, I shall end by sketching out 
an alternative to Boersma’s “theophanic view of the beatific vision,” which he 
presents as his own conclusion. 
The first of the two parts of Boersma’s alleged deficit is a shortfall in 
references to the causal link between Christ’s glory and that of the saints. 
Boersma (2018b, 135) says, “Though we can indeed show that Aquinas held to 
such a link, he rarely refers to it. As such, it remains fair to suggest that on this 
score his theology suffers from a christological deficit.” As already noted, 
Boersma and I are now agreed on the fact that Aquinas held that the saints’ 
beatific vision depends on Christ. Moreover, we are also agreed that there is an 
absence from Aquinas’s writings of anything but a few references to the thesis. 
What we disagree on is whether or not this absence constitutes a deficit. A 
deficit, it seems to me, is more than an absence of something. An absence 
becomes a deficit when what is absent should be there, such that there is a 
shortfall in the “requisite amount”, and for this something or someone can be 
held responsible. The power to fly is absent from among the powers of my 
humanity, but I do not think that anyone would regard this absence as 
constituting a deficit in my powers, thereby apportioning blame for it, since it is 
not natural to human physiology that people can flap their forelimbs and fly. 
Were I instead to lack knowledge of basic moral principles, someone would be 
in a better position to judge there to be a deficit in my knowledge, and ask who 
was culpable for it, given that such knowledge should be there. In the case of 
Aquinas’s doctrine of the causal dependence of the saints’ vision on Christ, 
which he mentions only rarely, Boersma holds Aquinas guilty of some deficit, 
and I do not. Boersma (2018, 5) says that, despite our agreements, I still feel that 
he misrepresents Aquinas. While that is indeed so, it may be more to the point 
to say that I think Boersma misjudges Aquinas.  
Aquinas, like anyone else, must be judged on the evidence, as Boersma 
would surely agree. Part of what lies behind our divergence is what counts as 
evidence in assessing Aquinas’s eschatology. Boersma seems willing to admit as 
true evidence only what Aquinas has actually said, together with what he does 
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not say where Boersma supposes that he should have said it (Boersma 2018b, 
132–33). I, however, have appealed not simply to what Aquinas does and does 
not say, but to the wider context of what he does and does not say, namely, the 
placing of eschatology as part of his mature thought in an explicitly 
Christological setting, as evidenced in the plan he announces for the Summa 
Theologiae, together with the place of Christology itself within the Summa’s 
wider structure, and the implications of intellectual commitments that run 
throughout his thought (Gaine 2018, 123–26; Gaine 2016, 434–35). Only in light 
of such wider considerations can we see where in the Summa Aquinas was 
planning to speak of the issue in question, what he had been committing 
himself to say, and why he did not treat it explicitly in other places. Only so, it 
seems to me, can we come to a proper appreciation of what Aquinas actually 
did or did not say about Christ and the beatific vision, to a fair judgement from 
the point of view of historical theology as to whether or not he is guilty of a 
Christological deficit, and beyond that to a fair and fruitful comparison by 
systematic theology of his approach with those of other theologians, including 
Boersma himself. In contrast, Boersma wants to interpret the texts not by 
including such a full exploration of them on their own terms, but according to 
his own dogmatic judgement of what should be said in any one place in the 
Summa (Boersma 2018b, 135–36). It seems to me that there is a difference 
between the two of us on how historical theology should approach theologians 
of the past in order to make an assessment of their work and so bring them into 
dialogue with other theological positions in systematic theology. While my 
approach leads me to conclude that there is no Christological deficit, Boersma’s 
leads him to say that there is.  
Boersma locates the first factor in the paucity of Aquinas’s actual references to 
the link between Christ’s vision and that of the saints, and holds Aquinas 
culpable for it. His current criticism of Aquinas is not that he does not hold the 
thesis in question, but that he does not mention it very often, and not at all in 
places where he should have done. In his assessment of the evidence he is 
prepared to admit, Boersma quite rightly holds that, if a theologian mentions 
something a lot, it must be important to that theologian. For example, Boermsa 
is much taken by how often John Owen spoke of Christ in connection with the 
beatific vision: “What stands out almost immediately when we read John Owen 
on the beatific vision is the marked quantity of references to Christ as the object 
of our beatific vision.” (Boersma 2018b, 137) Now we can agree that this 
quantity surely manifests that it is an important part of Owen’s eschatology that 
the beatific vision is directed to Christ. But, more controversially, Boersma 
seems also inclined to hold that, if a theologian mentions something only rarely, 
then it is somehow lacking real importance to that theologian. For example, I 
have argued elsewhere that vision of the divine essence is also part of Owen’s 
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understanding of the beatific vision (Gaine 2016, 436; see also McDonald 2012, 
150). Boersma, however, makes much of the fact that this is mentioned in only 
two passages, where in each case Owen goes on to mention Christ. Boersma 
refuses to conclude from these passages that Owen agreed with Aquinas that 
the beatific vision is directed to the divine essence. He says that such a view 
“fails duly to take account of the extraordinary preponderance of references to 
Christ as the object of the beatific vision.” (Boersma 2018b, 140) Boersma is 
impressed by many references and unimpressed by few, and so he says that 
Owen’s “unrelenting focus on Christ the object of our beatific vision does not 
jive with the two comments he makes about seeing the divine essence.” 
Boersma sees Owen as “inconsistent” for accepting both, but interprets “the 
bottom line” of Owen’s theology of the beatific vision as lying in Christ’s person 
and human nature. He writes, “We cannot take one or two isolated passages, 
which are in obvious tension with the overall drift of Owen’s teaching, as 
representative of his theology.” For Boersma, the many references triumph over 
the few.  
When it comes to interpreting Aquinas on the first part of the “deficit”, 
Boersma is likewise impressed by many references and unimpressed by few. 
Since Aquinas mentions the link between Christ’s vision and that of the saints 
only rarely, Boersma seems to suppose it was not important to him. While I 
agree that many mentions of a thesis by a theologian demonstrate its 
importance to that theologian, I would be more wary of assuming that few 
mentions betray a corresponding unimportance. It seems to me there can be 
many reasons why theologians mention something important to them only 
rarely or not at all, and it is the task of the historical theologian, in seeking a 
deeper understanding of a predecessor’s doctrine, to investigate such 
possibilities. It may be, for example, that the matter in question is so universally 
accepted that the predecessor felt no need to make it explicit. In the case of 
Owen, it may be that he did not mention the divine essence so much because it 
was widely accepted that the beatific vision was directed to it, while his 
particular theory of Christ’s epistemological mediation of the vision was more 
novel and required more attention. It is for such reasons that I do not judge his 
mere two mentions indicative of a theological deficit. In the case of Aquinas, I 
suggested in my previous article, first, that he does not mention his own 
understanding of Christ’s mediation of the heavenly vision very often for the 
reason that the appropriate question that required its treatment was never 
raised (Gaine, 2018, 9–10), although, secondly, there is reason to think that he 
would have so treated it, had he completed the Summa (Gaine 2018, 125–26; see 
also Gaine 2016, 434–35). In his response to me, Boersma rejects both points 
(Boersma 2018b, 135–36). In what follows, I shall clarify each point, while taking 
account of Boersma’s criticisms. 
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My suggestion that Aquinas was intending to treat the question of the 
dependence of the saints’ beatific vision on Christ’s humanity later in the 
unfinished section of the Summa is based, from a historical viewpoint, on the 
theological structure of the whole work. The Summa is divided into three parts, 
and the Third Part is devoted to Christology. While Aquinas treats the vision 
from other points of view in the First and Second Parts, as we shall see, it is 
only in the Third Part that he treats it in explicit connection with his doctrine of 
Christ. This he does in his section on Christ’s knowledge (ST, III, q. 9, a. 2; q. 10, 
see Gaine 2015), and I have contended that there is reason to suppose that he 
would have done so again when treating eschatology within the Christological 
Third Part, had he not left the Third Part uncompleted (Gaine 2018, 125–26).  
Boersma (2018b, 132–33) responds with a certain measure of scepticism to my 
suggestion that Aquinas would have treated the Christological aspects of the 
beatific vision in this way, and is hesitant to introduce such “speculation” into 
his assessment of Aquinas’s theology. He says that the “only evidence” for my 
suggestion “is ST I, q. 2, proem.” (Boersma 2018b, 135) This is the passage near 
the beginning of the Summa where Aquinas sets out his tripartite structure, 
saying of the Third Part simply that it was to treat of “Christ, who as man, is the 
way to God”. Boersma’s complaint is that, as the only piece of evidence in 
favour of my thesis, it “has to do a lot of heavy lifting.” I take him not to mean 
that the passage does not show that the Third Part treats Christology, since that 
is evident from the quotation. What he says is that “whatever [Aquinas] may 
have planned to write by way of a doctrine of the last things, this passage gives 
no evidence that in the unfinished segment of Pars III he would have written 
what he mostly failed to write elsewhere. It is possible, and it would be 
consonant with his overall position. But there is no necessary logic requiring it 
in the passage Gaine mentions.” It is for this reason that Boersma does not 
admit my historical appeal to the wider context and structure of the Summa as 
evidence for determining whether or not Aquinas is guilty of a Christological 
deficit: the appeal “does not work,” Boersma says.  
While I agree that the content of this passage can hardly provide a 
“necessary logic” by which a treatment of Christ’s role in the beatific vision 
under the heading of eschatology is absolutely entailed, I do think it marks the 
beginning of an historical–theological case that it is highly implausible that 
Aquinas would not have expressed in that treatise what Boersma and I are 
agreed was his opinion. While I agree that this does not follow by strict logical 
necessity, there is a case to say that it is more than one simple possibility among 
others. Besides the passage Boersma cites from near the beginning of the 
Summa, there are in fact other passages relevant to my case. So while ST, I, q. 2, 
proem. does not explicitly herald a treatment of eschatology in the Third Part, 
that is what we find in the introduction to the Part itself. Aquinas says: 
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“Because our Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ … showed forth to us in himself the 
way of truth by which we are able to attain the beatitude of immortal life by 
rising again, it is necessary for the completion of the entire business of theology 
that, after our consideration of the final end of human life and the virtues and 
vices [the Second Part], there should follow a consideration of the Saviour of all 
and the benefits bestowed by him on the human race. Concerning this we must 
consider: first, the Saviour himself; secondly, his sacraments, through which we 
obtain salvation; thirdly, immortal life, which we attain through him by rising 
again.”  
From this I take it to be clear that the Summa’s Christological Part was to 
include material about the life of heaven. Indeed Aquinas manifests the same 
intention from time to time within the Third Part by noting that he is reserving 
certain eschatological questions for such a section (e.g., ST 3, q. 54, a. 1; q. 59, 
proem.). Not that we can suppose from this that these occasional references will 
give an exhaustive list of every question Aquinas was to raise there. It might be 
tempting to suppose that his explicit references to the resurrection mean that he 
was to treat nothing other than the resurrection in that section. There were, 
however, other areas of eschatology not yet properly addressed in the Summa, 
and which would surely not have been omitted from a treatise on eschatology. 
One example is the purgatorial state for separated souls, which had been but 
alluded to elsewhere in the Summa, with the promise of fuller treatment to come 
(ST III, q. 52, a. 8, obj. 2). While Aquinas had admittedly treated beatific 
knowledge more extensively than mere allusion in various places in the Summa, 
these passages hardly add up to a full treatment of this heavenly beatitude, as 
we shall see. 
A further reason to suppose that Aquinas was to return to the beatific vision 
is based on the fact he understood the bodily glory of the saints in terms of an 
overflow of the glory of the soul (ST, I–II, q. 3, a. 3 ad 3). He could not have 
treated the glory of the body under the resurrection without recalling the glory 
of the soul, where the glory of the intellect takes pride of place as the act of 
beatific vision. Back when Aquinas was dealing with the role of supernatural 
grace, he had not neglected to treat of it in regard to the intellect, before turning 
to the will (ST, I–II, q. 109, a. 1). In the case of glory, which is the consummation 
of grace, we should likewise expect attention to the intellect and indeed to its 
most important act. Moreover, Aquinas had certainly indicated as recently as 
the Second Part that the infused (as distinct from beatific) knowledge of the 
saints could increase up to the day of judgement (ST II–II, q. 52, a. 3; cf. ST, I, q. 
106, a. 4). The intellectual life of heavenly glory was thus ripe for further 
consideration in the Summa’s eschatology. 
Having confirmed that such eschatological questions were to be treated in 
the Third Part, it seems to me highly implausible, on the basis of a sound 
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historical theology, to suppose that Aquinas intended to treat these or any other 
questions in this Christological Part of the Summa without treating them 
Christologically. I made the point in my response to Boersma that Aquinas’s 
approach to the sacraments in the Third Part was perspicuously Christological 
(Gaine 2018, 125). The upshot is that we cannot suppose that Aquinas was 
going to treat the life of heaven in an explicitly Christological context without 
asking about the role played by Christ in the heavenly lives of the saints. The 
fact that Aquinas says at the beginning of the Third Part that their arrival at 
“immortal life” takes places through Christ by their resurrection alludes to his 
teaching that their rising depends causally on Christ’s (cf. ST, III, q. 56, a. 1). 
Given that Aquinas held that at the essential core of heavenly life lies the 
intellectual act of beatific vision, the only fair assessment historical theology can 
give is that it is highly unlikely that he would not have asked about the causal 
role of Christ in regard to this act too. Not to have done so would have been a 
decisive departure from the Christological character he envisaged for the whole 
of the Third Part.  
Moreover, we know what answer Aquinas would almost certainly have 
given to this question, since, as Boersma now agrees, he already took the view 
that the saints’ glory was causally dependent on that of Christ, as indicated so 
recently as III, q. 22, a. 5. For Aquinas to have abandoned this answer for 
another in the meantime would have meant also relinquishing his 
thoroughgoing commitment across physics, metaphysics and theology to the 
principle that the first in the genus is the cause of all else in the genus, together 
with the identification of Christ as the Head especially of those in glory (ST III, q. 
8, a. 3; see Gaine 2018, 122–24). From the point of view of a sound historical 
theology, the burden surely lies on one who entertains such a decisive 
departure to produce a reason why Aquinas would have abandoned such a 
strong a philosophical commitment and so clear a recognition of the causal 
primacy of Christ as Head of the Body. But that is not what Boersma does. 
Boersma (2018b, 132) limits his agreement with me in this to what Aquinas 
should have done: he should have treated the question of Christ’s role in the 
beatific vision of the saints, and he should have said that their glory was 
dependent on that of Christ. For some reason, Boersma hesitates to commit 
himself to the view that this is what Aquinas would have done. While, on the 
basis of my approach to historical theology, I take the view that Aquinas, with 
his characteristic consistency, would surely have done what he should have 
done, Boersma holds back. While he treats Aquinas’s affirmation of the thesis 
here as a mere possibility, I have treated it more as probable, almost certain, on 
the basis of a wider set of evidence. If my approach to historical theology is 
sound, then Aquinas can be shown to have been going some way to clearing 
himself of the charge of a Christological deficit.  
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Boersma, however, by his own dogmatic lights, demands more than a single 
treatment at the end of the Summa: he expects Aquinas to mention Christ’s role 
every time the beatific vision is addressed. And so I turn from my first point 
about what Aquinas might have written to my second point, namely, those 
treatments of the beatific vision he did complete, and what he did and did not 
write there. The passages Boersma (2018b, 136) brings forward are ST I, q. 12 
and ST I–II, qq. 1–5. The first asks whether God’s essence can be known, and 
the second enquires into human happiness or beatitude. Our question is 
whether there must be a deficit on Aquinas’s part if he did not mention the 
heavenly causal role of Christ in these two previous treatments of the beatific 
vision. While Boersma answers, on the basis of his own dogmatic position, that 
there is a deficit, my own more historically–informed view has been that 
Aquinas had no reason to make explicit mention of the thesis in either passage, 
because each was addressing questions that did not require the thesis to be 
raised at those points (Gaine 2018, 124–25). I argue, again in connection with the 
theological method expressed in the structure of the Summa, that whether or not 
an individual passage is guilty of a Christological deficit should be judged 
according to whether or not Aquinas’s own method required him to speak of 
the thesis here. If it required him to do so, and he did not, there would be a 
deficit. But if it did not require him to do so, he cannot be blamed for any such 
deficit. This is why, on my more historical approach, we should assess 
Aquinas’s content on the basis of what he took himself to be doing in each case, 
in the context of his wider work. 
Boersma, however, rejects my view. He says, “Now, it is certainly true that 
what Aquinas tells us depends on the question he asks. But that does not mean 
that we should not have any assumptions of our own with regard to the 
questions he should ask.” (Boersma 2018b, 136) I take Boersma to mean not just 
that we can have our own assumptions about which questions Aquinas should 
ask in a formal way, but also about the content of his answers, together with his 
reasons for treating these questions and answers. In terms of content, it seems 
to me that, on Boersma’s own dogmatic view of the relationship between Christ 
and the beatific vision, he must assume that any treatment of the beatific vision 
by any theologian should include how that theologian envisages the role of 
Christ in the vision. Given then that Aquinas held to the heavenly causal power 
of Christ’s vision, it can be assumed that he should have treated that causal 
power at every point he treated the beatific vision.  
Boersma also introduces a further but more historical assumption about why 
Aquinas should have mentioned the thesis in the two passages he brings 
forward. He explains: “Aquinas’s discussion of the vision of the divine essence 
in ST I, q. 12 raises a historically much–controverted issue, and it would not 
have been out place for Aquinas to explain that the saints will see the divine 
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essence precisely because Christ himself eternally sees the divine essence … 
Similarly, it would not be unreasonable to expect at least some discussion of 
Christ’s role in mediating the beatific vision when Aquinas discusses the nature 
of happiness.” However, Boersma gives no clue as to how the historic content 
of these controversies about the beatific vision would have required Aquinas to 
appeal to Christ’s heavenly role. Nevertheless, he makes the very strong 
conclusion that “Aquinas would have had every reason to turn his attention to 
Christ’s eternal role in his prolific writings on the beatific vision.” In what 
follows I shall clarify my own understanding of why Aquinas did not discuss 
this issue in I, q. 12 and I–II, qq. 1–5 with reference to the overall structure of the 
Summa. In doing this I hope to confirm, according to this more historical 
approach, how we may legitimately have a different expectation of what 
Aquinas should and would do under the heading of eschatology from what he 
had done in earlier sections of the Summa.  
The Third Part aims among other things to show why Christ was a very 
fitting Saviour for us. Aquinas did not think that incarnation was the only way 
open to God by which he could have saved us (ST, III, q. 1, a. 2), and this is of 
crucial importance to his method and the Summa’s structure.1 What Aquinas 
aims to do is to explore God’s wisdom in freely choosing the incarnation of the 
Son as his way of saving sinners. This theological understanding is achieved by 
setting out beforehand in the Second Part what it would take for human 
creatures to return to God as their happiness. This supernatural beatitude and 
the means to attain it are things God could have conferred on us without an 
incarnation. But, having set out in the Second Part the character of such 
beatitude and what would be required for attaining it in terms of grace, virtues 
and gifts, and so on, Aquinas has put himself in a good position to show in the 
Third Part why the incarnate Son was so a fitting a way for human beings to 
make this return to that end through such means.  
This method of reserving Christology to the Third Part, and so seeing its 
divine wisdom in the light of the divinely–established requirements of the 
Second Part, calls for a nuanced approach to how Christ makes any appearance 
in the First and Second Parts. While Christ is unavoidably present throughout 
the Summa, whether implicitly or indeed explicitly, since much of the contents 
of the First and Second Parts, as with the Third, is dependent on divine 
revelation through Christ, Aquinas aims to avoid unnecessary repetition (cf. ST, 
proem.) by reserving formal treatment of questions about Christ to the Third 
Part. This means that he made reference to Christ in the earlier parts only 
insofar as it was useful to his theological purpose. Hence, while his doctrine of 
grace, for example, was undoubtedly shaped in his own mind by revelation 
                                                          
1 For relevant literature, see Barnes (2012, 183–93). Also of interest is Jordan (2017, 12–16). 
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through Christ, he held that grace could have been given without an 
incarnation, and so he does not speak explicitly of Christ so much in the treatise 
on grace. But once that treatise is set out within the Second Part, Aquinas has 
made suitable preparation to show in the Third Part why Christ fittingly 
possessed a fullness of grace so that he might cause it in us as Head of the Body 
(ST, III, q. 7, a. 9).  
The causation of grace provides us with a ready example of how Aquinas 
typically would have occasion to mention Christ in the Second Part. In I–II, q. 
112, a. 1, Aquinas asks what the efficient cause of grace is. Despite the 
important fact that the grace we experience is the grace of Christ our Head, his 
response is not given over to emphasising this important Christological truth. 
Instead his argument runs through the limitations of created nature, grace as 
surpassing nature, and grace as divinization, to the conclusion that only God 
and no creature can cause grace. He does not need to bring forward 
Christological material from the Third Part to establish this conclusion.  
Where Christ does appear in the article, as is typical in this treatise, is in an 
objection and its answer. He is explicitly of importance to the issue of grace’s 
cause because John 1:17, as was widely known, says that grace came through 
Jesus Christ. But if Scripture says that “Jesus Christ” (signifying here not only 
his divinity but also his created nature) brings about grace in us, then that 
seems to suggest that a created reality can be the cause of grace after all. 
Aquinas answers the objection by distinguishing between a principal cause and 
its instrument, where the principal cause is divine and Christ’s humanity the 
instrument: Christ’s humanity causes grace not by its own power but by virtue 
of its union with the divinity, through which Christ’s actions are salvific (ad 1). 
It is only in the Third Part that Aquinas unfolds the saving meaning of this 
instrumentality for us in regard to Christ’s human nature, his sufferings, and 
his actions on our behalf from this life through to the next. My point is that the 
Second Part does not make this brief anticipation of an extensive Christological 
doctrine for the reason that it is important in a general way to the causation of 
grace (though it is). For Aquinas, this mention of Christ in the Second Part 
would have been deemed necessary because of the well–known witness of 
Scripture, its potential to be misinterpreted, and so the question of the causation 
of grace to be wrongly answered by misidentifying Christ’s humanity as the 
principal cause of grace. Aquinas has a positive reason here to anticipate 
material that properly belongs to the Third Part. 
This is but one example of how, whenever Aquinas anticipates the material 
of the Third Part in an objection, a response, or a sed contra, he does so with a 
specific theological purpose in mind. Absent such a purpose, he tends to leave 
Christological material to the Third Part, where it can have best effect in light of 
what had gone before. But, given that there are examples of where Aquinas 
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anticipates material from the Third Part for definite reasons, we need then to 
ask whether Aquinas should have made a similar anticipation in his earlier 
treatments of the beatific vision, for reasons such as historical controversy about 
the vision, which Boersma suggests. If he should have done so, but failed to, 
that would surely count as evidence of a Christological deficit in that passage. 
Should it be found plausible that he had no need to do so, an absence of the 
thesis can hardly be reckoned a deficit.  
Although it is true that various aspects of the issue were controversial in 
Aquinas’s time, it is not clear to me how the causal power of Christ’s beatific 
vision would help Aquinas in his entry into controversy on any of these issues.  
For his part Aquinas evidently did not find it “in place” to bring forward to the 
First Part a thesis that properly belonged to the Third Part, and I take that to be 
the case for the following reasons. I understand Aquinas’s omission to be 
rooted in the fact that in I, q. 12 he was not giving a full account of heaven or 
even of that core aspect which is the beatific vision (Gaine 2018, 125). He is 
rather, as part of his treatise on God in himself, asking about the different ways 
in which God can be known. One suggestion among others is that intellectual 
creatures can know God by vision of his essence. Aquinas wants to ask whether 
such knowledge is possible, by what epistemological means it would take place, 
whether it would be exercised through natural power, and so on. In each case 
Aquinas’s argumentation does not include reference to Christ’s beatific vision 
causing that of the saints, and, as I have said, this is presumably because 
Aquinas did not judge that Christological material appropriate to the Third Part 
was needed to make any of the arguments required in his responses.  
For example, since he held that the incarnation, though so very fitting a way 
for God in his wisdom to bestow supernatural life on creatures, was not in 
theory absolutely necessary for that bestowal, I take it that he judged there to be 
no need to appeal in the first article to Christ and his causal power in order to 
establish the general possibility of beatific knowledge. Instead that is done by 
an appeal to such things as the natural desire to know God. As for an appeal to 
revelation in the response and the sed contra, he thinks that the reality of 
knowledge of God’s essence in heaven can be most easily secured by 
authoritative reference to the fact that blessed know God just as he is (1 John 
3:2). No further reference from Scripture or Tradition to the causal dependence 
of the saints’ eternal enjoyment of this knowledge is required to establish the 
fact of their heavenly knowledge and so of its possibility. How it is caused by 
Christ is thus reserved to the Third Part, where the actual relationship of the 
beatific vision to Christ, given the fact of the incarnation, is properly raised. 
However, we may wonder whether, while not required in the response or sed 
contra, the causal power of Christ’s beatific vision might appear in the 
objections and their answers. In response, it seems to me that, since any 
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objection in this article must as such seek to undermine the possibility of 
knowledge of God’s essence, any appeal to the causal power of Christ’s beatific 
vision would be self–defeating to such an extent that it could hardly merit 
inclusion in any objection. But with no requirement to base his conclusion on 
Christ’s heavenly causal power in this or indeed any other article in the 
question, it seems to me that Aquinas must be cleared of any Christological 
deficit in I, q. 12. If there is no case to show why he should have anticipated 
material from the Third Part here, he cannot be found guilty of not doing so. 
I turn now to the other section Boersma brings forward, that is, the opening 
questions of the Second Part. Boersma thinks it not unreasonable that Aquinas 
should have discussed Christ’s mediating role in the beatific vision in his 
treatment of happiness and our final end. He points out that Aquinas does not 
strictly reserve eschatological questions for the end of the Summa, but addresses 
them at the beginning of the Second Part (Boersma, 2018b, 136). As we shall see, 
this is to some extent correct. Boersma then (on the basis of his own theological 
assumptions) goes on: “One cannot—or at least should not—discuss this topic 
without consideration of how Christ relates to the saints in their final state of 
happiness.” And not only that: “If our happiness is a participation in Christ’s 
happiness, would that not be one of the first things to mention in discussing the 
nature of happiness?” It is evident, however, that it need not be mentioned 
among the first, if it need not be mentioned at all. In seeking to explain why 
Aquinas does not mention it at all, I shall again appeal historically to the overall 
theological structure of the Summa. While I agree with Boersma that Aquinas 
should mention Christ’s causal role in connection with our heavenly beatitude, 
I take the view that he would have done so in his treatise on eschatology at the 
end of the Christological Third Part, where Boersma’s demands would indeed 
apply. The reason why Aquinas did not do so in the Second Part lies in the way 
the Second Part makes ready for the Third by treating eschatological questions 
in a way that laid the ground for a fuller, Christological treatment of 
eschatology later on. 
As I said above, Aquinas did not think that God could have made human 
beings perfectly happy only through an incarnation. He thought that God could 
have conferred the beatific vision on them without an incarnation, but that the 
incarnation was a most fitting way to do so, freely chosen by God in his 
wisdom. Aquinas expresses this in the Summa by offering a more general 
account of human happiness in the Second Part, which is the basis of then 
showing in the Third Part how that very happiness, already delineated, is 
fittingly caused in us through Christ. The opening questions of the Second Part 
are thus not meant to give a complete eschatology, but among other things to 
prepare for a more complete eschatology in the Third Part. To a significant 
extent this means reserving Christ’s role in causing human happiness to later in 
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the Summa, rather than (as Boersma supposes) treating it now. As with the 
consideration of the beatific vision in the First Part, and the First and Second 
Parts more generally, Aquinas does not bring forward material from the Third 
Part without a specific reason (see ST I–II, q. 3, a. 7 ad 2).  He does not in 
general need to bring material forward from Christology (and that includes the 
heavenly causal role of Christ’s beatific vision) to establish for instance that God 
is the final end of all creatures (ST, I–II, q. 1, aa. 7–8), or that human beings as 
such attain their beatitude through an act of intellect (ST, I–II, q. 3), and so on. 
Nor does any particular historical controversy about these matters, as far as I 
can see, mean that mention of Christ’s causal power is required to make any 
argument work. Aquinas can show that only the beatific vision answers to the 
human desire for beatitude without appealing to the fact that Christ causes the 
beatitude of the saints through his own. But, having argued in this way for his 
conclusions, Aquinas puts himself in a position to show the fittingness of 
Christ’s actual role in all this in his Christological account of heaven at the end 
of the Third Part. But if Aquinas was not required to bring this forward to the 
opening of the Second Part in order to make his arguments there work, as my 
more historical approach has shown, then he can be cleared of any 
Christological deficit in this passage.  
Since neither of the passages Boersma brings forward requires appeal to the 
causal power of the heavenly Christ to establish their conclusions, we can 
suppose that each is cleared of the charge of Christological deficit. Since neither 
passage nor both together can be reckoned the Summa’s complete treatment of 
the beatific vision, Aquinas’s position on that vision in the Summa overall 
cannot be assessed without counting in the eschatological treatise he never 
wrote. On the assumption that Aquinas would have properly addressed the 
question of Christ’s heavenly role in the Third Part, which I have argued is 
highly probable, we could regard him as entirely free of the first element of 
Christological deficit. If Boersma were now more convinced of my historical–
theological argument from the Summa’s method and structure, but still unsure 
that Aquinas would have done as he should, he might be willing to admit at the 
very least that the jury must remain out.  
Almost all of what I have said, however, in considering the first factor in 
Aquinas’s alleged deficit is not what is of primary importance to Boersma. I 
turn now to the second part of his alleged Christological deficit, which he holds 
to be the more important of the two. He writes, “My problems with Aquinas’s 
views on the beatific vision run deeper. They have to do with the fact that he 
does not treat Christ as the object of the beatific vision … The most worrying 
part of Aquinas’s christological deficit is his focus on the divine essence as 
opposed to Jesus Christ as the object of our eternal worship and vision.” 
(Boersma 2018b, 136) Boersma (2018a, 51) is of the opinion that Aquinas 
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“substitutes” the divine essence for the incarnate Christ. It is here, he says, 
where “the main dogmatic disagreement appears: is it the divine essence 
(Aquinas and Gaine) or is it Jesus Christ (Owen and I) that constitutes the object 
of the beatific vision?” (Boersma, 2018b, 142)  
In my reply I had naively supposed that a single quotation from Aquinas’s 
Compendium Theologiae substantiating Christ’s humanity as a second object of 
the beatific vision would have been sufficient to refute the suggestion that 
Aquinas denied that Christ was seen in this vision. As we saw in regard to the 
first element of his alleged deficit, Boersma is impressed by many references 
and unimpressed by few. Boersma (2018b, 137) is singularly unimpressed with 
this one “incidental reference”. He is impressed by Owen’s many references to 
Christ as object, “in comparison with which the one reference in Aquinas’s 
Compendium theologiae simply fades in significance.” (Boersma 2018b, 138) It 
would thus surely help little to add that Aquinas makes the same point in his 
Commentary on the Gospel of John, and yet it seems interesting enough to add, 
since the Commentary is regarded by scholars as an important expression of 
Aquinas’s mature thought (e.g., Emery 2003, 271–319). When commenting on 
Jesus’ words to the Father in 17:3, “this is eternal life, to know you, the only true 
God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent,” Aquinas says that by those words 
“we are given to understand that in eternal life we shall also take joy from the 
humanity of Christ” (In Ioannem, 17.1). In explaining the substantial meaning of 
“eternal life”, Aquinas is clearly referring to the beatific vision, meaning that 
that very act of the intellect must be directed to the humanity of Christ also. Of 
course adding this reference to the one from the Compendium simply makes one 
plus one equal two, and two is not many! What may be more helpful is to 
explain how, in view of Aquinas’s “unrelenting focus” (Boersma 2018, 12) on 
the divine essence, he can maintain that Christ’s humanity is also an object of 
the vision.  
To understand this, we must begin with his account of God’s own 
knowledge, in which the beatific vision participates. According to Aquinas, 
God knows himself perfectly through himself (ST, I, q. 14, a. 2), and he is 
identical with his own essence (ST, I, q. 3, a. 3). Thus he knows his own essence 
through that same essence. What, though, if one were to suppose that such 
focus were to mean that God did not know anything besides himself, especially 
in view of the fact that Christian faith holds that God is omniscient? Must such 
focus exclude knowledge of all other realities, including the humanity assumed 
by God the Son? For Aquinas, that is not the case because God’s perfect 
knowledge of himself naturally includes knowledge of his power, of all he can 
and does do (ST, I, q. 14, a. 5). This knowledge is perfect and cannot be 
improved on or added to in any way. By knowing himself in this way, God will 
also know whatever he freely wills to be, including the humanity of the divine 
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Son, and will do so more powerfully than any created intellect can by its own 
connatural knowledge, even with the help of faith. 
Since the beatific vision is a created intellect’s participation in this divine 
knowledge through the divine essence, it makes no more sense to suppose that 
the beatific vision’s participated focus on the divine essence necessarily 
excludes knowledge of Christ than does the focus of God’s knowledge on 
himself. Of course a saint will not be omniscient through the divine essence, as 
God is, since while God’s act of knowledge is infinite, the beatific act of any 
creature is as such finite. While God knows all he can do in the divine essence, 
the blessed do not perfectly match that knowledge but, knowing God as the 
cause of all, the more powerfully they know God (Aquinas thinks), the more 
extensive will be their knowledge of God’s effects in the divine essence. 
Aquinas establishes this as a general rule in the First Part (ST, I, q. 12, a. 8), 
which sets up an account of knowledge of God’s essence in such a way that we 
will be able to learn in the Third Part how this is fittingly brought about 
through Christ. At this earlier stage Aquinas has no need to mention Christ, 
especially as he will not establish until the Third Part that an incarnation is 
fitting. In the First Part it is simply concluded in a general way that the blessed 
will have knowledge of God’s effects, whatever they might be (whether they 
include an incarnation or not), in the divine essence. Aquinas surmises that this 
has to include whatever is required to satisfy the natural human desire for 
knowledge, though this leaves much not required for such satisfaction (ad 4). 
How all this is applied in individual cases, according to the individual needs of 
the blessed, will come only in the Third Part, once it is established that our 
salvation comes most fittingly through the Son’s incarnation.  
The only individual case Aquinas treated before he left off writing was Christ 
himself. Since Christ’s act of beatific vision must be finite, it cannot extend to all 
God could possibly do (as does Christ’s divine knowledge). Aquinas 
nevertheless argues that, since Christ is the judge of all, he himself must have 
knowledge in the divine essence of all that God actually wills to be (ST, III, q. 
10, a. 2). Since this includes the incarnation, it is implied that Christ enjoys 
beatific knowledge of himself in the divine essence. It would thus be wrong to 
conclude that, when Aquinas attributed vision of the divine essence to Christ, 
he was thereby substituting the divine essence for Christ’s knowledge of 
himself or indeed of all creation. But since Aquinas did not complete the Summa 
with a further exploration of the beatitude of the glorified members of Christ’s 
Body, he did not give any further examples.  
However, from what Aquinas said in the Commentary on John, namely, that 
eternal life includes taking joy from Christ’s humanity, we can be sure that, 
beyond the minimum mentioned in the First Part (what would count for any 
world God might create, including a world where there was no incarnation), 
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the Third Part would have added Christ’s humanity as principal among what is 
known in the divine essence. The short Compendium gives us a reason for this, 
namely, that the saints can render fitting thanks for their salvation through 
Christ. The eschatological section of the larger Summa may have added a 
number of reasons, including the fact that the saints’ eternal vision depends 
eternally on the glorified Christ. Since all the saints have Christ as the 
instrumental cause of their grace and glory, they would in every case have 
knowledge of Christ in the divine essence, a beatific knowledge of him of a kind 
that could not be bettered. To focus on the divine essence is thus to include 
Christ as an object of beatific knowledge, not to exclude him. While we might 
expect that Aquinas would have made more explicit mention of Christ as object 
in his unwritten eschatological treatise, were he to have spoken there simply of 
the members of Christ’s Body seeing the divine essence, he must be understood 
to have been saying also that they see Christ, since the divine essence is seen not 
to the exclusion but to the inclusion of Christ. Was it then a Christological 
deficit for Aquinas to focus the beatific vision on the divine essence? I would 
say: Not at all, and that Aquinas is evidently not guilty of Boersma’s second 
charge. 
I am conscious in all this how Boersma’s criticisms of Aquinas are surely 
related to his own theological assumptions about the place of Christology in 
any systematic theology. If, on dogmatic grounds, one rejects Aquinas’s 
reservation of Christology to the Third Part of the Summa, then one is going to 
suppose that he should have treated Christ in any earlier section that treated the 
beatific vision, and be disinclined to arguments in Aquinas’s favour from 
historical theology. What Boersma’s position seems to come down to is a 
theological rejection of the structure of Aquinas’s whole project (which is not 
without formidable defenders), and this colours his judgement about whether 
or not Aquinas was guilty of a Christological deficit. For my part, I suggest that 
the historical theologian can in principle attempt a fairer verdict on some aspect 
of a predecessor’s work, not by dismissing it along with the whole, but rather 
by assessing that aspect as it stands within the context of the wider work in 
which that theologian happened to be engaged. In this way historical theology 
can make a more positive contribution by allowing theologians to be 
sympathetically and fairly assessed and so allowed to speak more genuinely in 
a fruitful dialogue with other theological voices of past and present to the 
advantage of systematic theology today. 
Boersma (2018b, 141), however, having examined both factors in his alleged 
deficit and found Aquinas wanting, moves the discussion on “towards a 
theophanic view of the beatific vision,” meaning one in which God is eternally 
seen by the saints in and through his manifestation in Christ’s (created) 
humanity. Comparing Owen and Aquinas (at least by my interpretation of him) 
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on Christ’s role in the beatific vision, he sees Aquinas as employing Christ as 
(instrumental) cause of the vision, and Owen employing him as 
(epistemological) means. He asserts that Aquinas’s identification of Christ as 
cause of the beatific vision “yields” the divine essence as the vision’s object, 
while Owen’s identification of him as means “leads to a theophanic and 
Christological account” of its object (Boersma 2018b, 142). He next says Owen 
would reject Aquinas’s identification of the divine essence as object because it 
means that the beatific vision is no longer theophanic, and in that interpretation 
of Owen Boersma is surely correct. After some exposition of Owen and others, 
Boersma (2018b, 143) declares that a theophanic approach is “the right one”. He 
then asserts that “[t]he reason we need a theophanic understanding of the 
beatific vision has to do with Chalcedonian Christology”. Boersma thinks that, 
while the unity of Christ’s person is expressed in a theophanic account (which 
is true), Aquinas’s non–theophanic account of the beatific vision separates rather 
than unites his two natures. In this more controversial claim Boersma attempts 
to undercut Aquinas’s Chalcedonian credentials.  
Boersma’s argument for this conclusion is weak. He bases it on an analogy I 
had employed to show how a saint must be “in Christ”, a member of his 
heavenly Body, in order to see God through a participation in Christ’s own 
vision. The comparison was of a sightseer standing in a certain place to enjoy a 
certain view. The point of the analogy was to show the importance of the close 
union of the saints with Christ, not to imply anything about distance in the 
relationship between the human nature of the Body’s Head and the divine 
essence. But Boersma makes a wholly unjustified leap from the analogy’s 
distance between the viewer and the landscape to the conclusion that Aquinas’s 
theory of Christ’s heavenly causal power puts the object of vision, the divine 
essence, at a “distance” from Christ own human body. Though he recognises 
that the spatial analogy is just that – an analogy – he concludes that it is “hard 
to escape the idea that the divine essence must be separate from and behind the 
incarnate Lord.” (Boersma 2018b,145). It seems to me that the idea of “distance” 
derives less from Aquinas’s theory of union in the Body of Christ and Christ’s 
heavenly causality, and more from Boersma’s gratuitous over–extension of the 
analogy. It is worth noting that Aquinas’s theory can be adequately expressed 
without any spatial analogy. If Boersma insists on overextending the analogy, I 
need not appeal to it at all. But even so, Aquinas’s Chalcedonian credentials 
remain intact. 
While I hold there to be many theological advantages to Aquinas’s account 
that could be listed here (see Gaine 2016, 440–46; Cortez 2018, 335–38), it might 
be useful at this point to conclude with just one of them by sketching out a 
Thomist alternative to Boersma’s move “towards a theophanic view of the 
beatific vision.” (Boersma 2018b, 141; see Gaine 2016, 441–42) I begin with the 
SIMON FRANCIS GAINE 
165 
 
fact that Aquinas does not deny heavenly theophanies. Unlike Owen, however, 
he does this explicitly in the wider context of theophany throughout the whole 
of the new creation (Gaine 2016, 444–45). In his early Commentary on the 
Sentences, Aquinas wrote that the glorified eye of a resurrected saint “will 
behold the divinity in its bodily effects, in which indications of the divine 
majesty will clearly appear, especially in the flesh of Christ, and then in the 
bodies of the blessed, and finally in all other bodies” (SsS, lib. 4, d. 48, q. 2; a. 1; 
ST, Suppl., q. 91, a. 1). Again he writes that “bodily sight will see so great a 
glory of God in bodies, especially in glorified bodies and most of all in the body 
of Christ” (SsS, lib. 4, d. 49, q. 2, a. 2; ST, Suppl., q. 92, a. 2), and this brings “a 
certain beatitude” to the saint’s body (ad 6). From this we may conclude that 
Aquinas envisages heaven as “theophanic”, where God is eternally manifested 
in the renewed creation, but above all in the Word made flesh. 
However, although Aquinas affirms here that the saints see an eternal 
manifestation of God in and through Christ, it is nevertheless true that Aquinas 
does not identify this physical vision, which brings “a certain beatitude”, with 
the beatific vision, which is the very “essence of beatitude” (cf. ST, I–II, q, 3, a. 4). 
In the Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas was explicitly distinguishing the 
eye’s vision of Christ (with its theophanic manifestation of divinity) from the 
intellectual vision of the divine essence. He does the same in his Commentary on 
Job when commenting on Job’s declaration that “in my flesh I shall see God, 
whom I myself will see and my eyes will behold him.” (19:26–7). Aquinas takes 
Job to be indicating that the body “will be also a participant in that vision in its 
own way … not because the eyes of the body would see the divine essence but 
because the eyes of the body will see God–made–man,” adding that the glory of 
God would be seen shining (theophanically) throughout the renewed creation 
(In Iob, 19). Thus Aquinas held that there would be what Boersma calls a 
“theophanic” manifestation of divinity in the new creation, above all in Christ’s 
body, for all eternity, but without conflating such manifestation in Christ with 
the beatific vision. 
While Boersma concedes that Aquinas holds that the saints will have 
physical sight of Christ’s body (Boersma 2018b, 135), in Seeing God he 
nevertheless raises the question of why Aquinas “did not discuss in detail how 
the saints will see Christ in the resurrection”, but was largely content in 
passages such as I, q. 12, a. 3 to discuss how the beatific vision is a vision of the 
“mind’s eye.” (Boersma 2018a, 367). I suggest that, if Aquinas planned to go 
into any more detail, he would have done so in his treatise on eschatology at the 
end of the Summa. That Aquinas had not abandoned his view that there would 
be a physical vision of Christ at the resurrection is clear from earlier in the Third 
Part. When dealing with the question as to whether Christ could be seen by the 
physical eye (whether glorified or not) under the form of the eucharist, Aquinas 
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stated that “the glorified eye always sees Christ as he is in his own form” (ST, 
III, q. 76 sed contra). However, it is true that it was Aquinas’s priority in earlier 
sections of the Summa simply to avoid confusion of any theophanic vision with 
the beatific vision. As far as Aquinas was concerned, no act of the senses could 
constitute the essence of beatitude in an intellectual creature (ST, I–II, q. 3, a. 3). 
He had no need to appeal to a theophany specifically of Christ to establish that. 
While Boersma supposes, as noted above, that Aquinas’s theory of Christ’s 
causality “yields” a non–theophanic account of the beatific vision, what in fact 
yields it is Aquinas’s conviction that no finite, created entity, including the 
humanity of Christ and every other theophany, can ever be an adequate 
epistemological means for knowing the infinite divine essence as such (cf. ST, I, 
q. 12, a. 2). Since human beings have a natural desire to know God, and this can 
only be fulfilled by knowledge of God’s essence, they can only be truly fulfilled 
through a means of knowledge that is adequate to that infinite essence and so 
non–theophanic. The only means of knowledge adequate for knowing God’s 
essence is that essence itself, which God gifts to the blessed in a self–
communication that in fact comes by way of the heavenly Christ’s causality and 
transcends any theophany.  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that God’s supra–theophanic 
self–gift destroys rather than perfects the heavenly reality of theophany. 
Boersma is concerned that a non–theophanic beatific vision undermines the role 
of the theophanic, and so of Christ. But, as we have seen, Aquinas treats the 
new creation, and especially the incarnate Christ, as thoroughly theophanic. 
What knowledge of and through the divine essence provides, which no 
theophany itself can provide, are the resources for perfect knowledge of this 
new creation as precisely what it is, namely, the theophanic manifestation of 
God. It is in light of these supra–theophanic resources that the saint beholds 
Christ and his Kingdom, truly knows them for what they are, and so gives high 
praise to God. While in this life we perceive by faith, not without a measure of 
indirectness, that God is manifest in his creation, in the next we shall truly 
know the new creation, and especially the humanity of Christ, precisely as 
theophanic, that is, by way of an immediate vision that transcends the 
theophanic and so brings the theophanic not to its ending but to its eternal 
significance.  
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